




# **CONGRESSIONAL TASKFORCE ON TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum  
Washington, DC

Winter 2015-2016 Report





THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. PITTENGER  
Chairman

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## PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE

### SECURITY FORUM

Winter 2015-2016 Report



## Strategy-Based Approach

Far too often, policy-makers fail to align budgeting and policy with a coherent strategy that reflects international security interests. The United States and its allies distribute vast amounts of resources in an effort to provide security and improve conditions around the world. Unfortunately, when those resources are not properly directed at achieving specific strategic goals, effectiveness suffers.

For example, it appears our government has overcommitted to an airstrike-only strategy against ISIS – a strategy that has failed to reduce the amount of ISIS soldiers on the battlefield. If the administration is serious about defeating ISIS, it must consider alternative strategies that more effectively degrade the enemy.

As Chairman of the Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, it has been my goal to streamline the process of providing security resources towards focused and effective strategies. An important strategic effort, for example, is countering terrorist group financing. There are many instances where our government can improve policies that assist law enforcement efforts to track and seize terrorist group funding. Moreover, the United States can enact policies that compel foreign governments to fully enforce their own terror finance laws.

When we look at the history of warfare and security policies, the most effective strategies have been narrowly tailored, with resources being devoted towards accomplishing targeted objectives. Legislators must consider this when appropriating resources for security initiatives – especially when addressing asymmetrical warfare policies.

With this in mind, I am pleased to have hosted parliamentarians from over 25 countries for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum, which occurred this past October 2015 in the Member's Room of the Library of Congress. For two days, discussions were held on how to reconcile strategy, budgeting, and policy initiatives on a range of issues, including countering terrorist group financing, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism policies.

On behalf of the legislators and policy experts who participated, I am pleased to release the following report which reflects our discussions and policy recommendations. A continued international dialogue will lead to broader cultural understanding and more effective security policy implementation.



Robert Pittenger  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism  
and Unconventional Warfare



## Introduction

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum provided an opportunity for legislators, Ambassadors, Executive officials, and security experts to engage in meaningful and open dialogue on timely and important policy matters. The themes for this year's forum included:

- Countering terrorist group financing;
- Cyber and technological supply-chain security; and
- International counterterrorism strategy and policy.

For two days, international legislators participated in several roundtable discussion sessions to exchange ideas and address mutual concerns. The Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare is pleased to publish the following report based on those discussions. This report includes a list of international participants, executive summaries of the various panel sessions, as well as a list of recommended action items for the United States Congress.

## International Participants

Australia	The Honorable Peter Heyward, Ambassador
Austria	The Honorable Werner Amon, Member of Parliament
Austria	The Honorable Andreas Karlsböck, Member of Parliament
Austria	The Honorable Hannes Weninger, Member of Parliament
Austria	The Honorable Peter Pilz, Member of Parliament
Albania	The Honorable Ilir Meta, Speaker of the Parliament
Albania	The Honorable Ara Dade, Member of Parliament
Albania	The Honorable Floreta Faber, Ambassador
Bulgaria	The Honorable Atanas Atanasov, Member of Parliament
Bulgaria	The Honorable Dimitar Lazarov, Member of Parliament
Bulgaria	The Honorable Valentin Kasabov, Member of Parliament
Bulgaria	The Honorable Tsvetan Tsvetanov, Member of Parliament
Bulgaria	The Honorable Filip Popov, Member of Parliament
Croatia	The Honorable Josip Leko, Speaker of the Parliament
Croatia	The Honorable Davor Bozinovic, Member of Parliament
Cyprus	The Honorable Demetris Syllouris, Member of Parliament
Cyprus	The Honorable Andreas Nikolaides, Deputy Chief of Mission
Czech Republic	The Honorable Jaroslava Jermanová, Member of Parliament
Czech Republic	The Honorable Josef Zahradníček, Member of Parliament
Czech Republic	The Honorable Jana Černochová, Member of Parliament
Czech Republic	The Honorable Václav Klučka, Member of Parliament
Czech Republic	The Honorable Bronislav Schwarz, Member of Parliament
Denmark	The Honorable Michael Jensen, Member of Parliament
Finland	The Honorable Eero Heinäluoma, Speaker of Parliament
Georgia	The Honorable Irakli Sesiashvili, Member of Parliament
Georgia	The Honorable Irakli Chikovani, Member of Parliament
Georgia	The Honorable Archil Gegeshidze, Ambassador

## International Participants

Germany	The Honorable Clemens Binniger, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable Fritz Felgentreu, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable Stephan Mayar, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable Hans-Christian Ströbele, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable Karl-Georg Wellmann, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable Uli Grötsch, Member of German Bundestag
Germany	The Honorable André Hahn, Member of German Bundestag
Hungary	The Honorable Gergely Gulyás, Member of Parliament
Hungary	The Honorable Márton Gyöngyösi, Member of Parliament
Hungary	The Honorable András Schiffer, Member of Parliament
Hungary	The Honorable Tamás Harangozó, Member of Parliament
Ireland	The Honorable Pat Breen, Member of Parliament
Italy	The Honorable Paolo Alli, Member of Parliament
Latvia	The Honorable Ainars Latkovskis, Member of Parliament
Latvia	The Honorable Solvita Āboltiņa, Member of Parliament
Lithuania	The Honorable Emanuelis Zingeris, Member of Parliament
Luxembourg	The Honorable Claude Wiseler, Member of Parliament
Malta	The Honorable Angelo Farrugia, Member of Parliament
Montenegro	The Honorable Ranko Krivokapić, President of the Parliament
Montenegro	The Honorable Darko Pajovic, Member of Parliament
Norway	The Honorable Kenneth Svendsen, Member of Parliament
Norway	The Honorable Andres Werp, Member of Parliament
Norway	The Honorable Kaare Simensen, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Petru Gabriel Vlase, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Valeriu Zgonea, Speaker of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Georgian Pop, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Alexandru Nazare, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Sorin Cimpanu, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Mihnea Costoiu, Member of Parliament
Romania	The Honorable Christian Istrate, Ambassador
Romania	The Honorable George Maior, Ambassador
Slovenia	The Honorable Branko Grims, Member of Parliament
Slovenia	The Honorable Jasna Murgel, Member of Parliament
Sweden	The Honorable Anti Avsan, Member of Parliament
Sweden	The Honorable Arhe Hamednaca, Member of Parliament
Ukraine	The Honorable Valentyn Karvan, Embassy Counsel
Ukraine	The Honorable Vitaliy Pogribnyi, Embassy Counsel
United Kingdom	The Honorable John Spellar, Member of Parliament
United Kingdom	The Honorable Bob Stewart, Member of Parliament
United Kingdom	The Honorable Crispin Blunt, Member of Parliament

# Presentations

## Welcome / Opening Statements

The Honorable Jeb Hensarling

Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services

The Honorable Michael Fitzpatrick

Chairman, Financial Services Committee Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing

The Honorable Bill Huizenga

Chairman, Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade

Brigadier General John A. Byrd

Assistant Adjutant General, Army, North Carolina National Guard

Introduction speakers focused on the importance of the Forum and the issues at hand. Especially with a multi-national audience, it is important to fully utilize opportunities to collaborate on security issues.

Furthermore, introduction speakers emphasized the importance of tracking and preventing terrorist group financing. Stopping the flow of dollars to illicit enterprises should be a priority for coalition governments.

*“Modern groups, such as ISIS, have access to global financial institutions. For a half a million dollars, terrorist groups were able to murder 3,000 of our citizens. Today, a half a million dollars is pocket change for a terrorist group like ISIS.”* – Chairman Hensarling

## Judicial Role in Security Policy

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte

Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary

Chairman Goodlatte appeared as the Forum’s first panelist. He has served on the House Judiciary Committee since he first assumed office in 1993.

Chairman Goodlatte discussed the evolving nature of threats that affect the United States and its allies, and how security and enforcement laws must adapt to address the changes. Mr. Goodlatte argued that there must be a constant balance between protection capabilities and civil liberties when implementing security policies.

*“The USA Freedom Act represents government at its best: it is the product of a robust public debate and intense bipartisan negotiations dedicated to finding a way to protect our Constitutional rights while enhancing the safety of our country. The bipartisan law ends the bulk collection of telephone metadata once and for all, enhances civil liberties protections, increases transparency for both American businesses and the government, and provides national security officials targeted tools to keep America safe.”* – Chairman Goodlatte

## Trans-Atlantic Relationship / Current Threats

**The Honorable Michael Chertoff**

Former Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

*“This is the most world disorder we’ve ever seen. With the Cold War, there was conflict around the edges, but it was unlikely there would be an outbreak of direct conflict. Today, there is extreme fragmentation, especially in the Middle East, to the point where terror groups have metastasized in many parts of Africa and Asia – and conflict is much more likely.” – Secretary Chertoff*

Secretary Chertoff discussed the evolution of terror tactics in 2015. Modern terror groups have placed emphasis on carrying out multiple smaller scale attacks. Technology and social media have enabled malicious groups to adjust their strategy and tactics to become more efficient at recruitment and the execution of operations.

Further, Mr. Chertoff stated that Russia’s involvement in the Middle East destabilizes the region, fuels civil war, and exacerbates the current refugee crisis.

*“Europe and the U.S. do not have a cohesive approach to address Russian involvement in Syria.” – Secretary Chertoff*

Lastly, Mr. Chertoff discussed next generation cyber threats, which include targeting and attempting to disrupt critical infrastructure (financial services, energy, telecommunications, etc).

*“Asymmetrical warfare levels the playing field, and geography no longer isolates countries from cyber and terror attacks.” – Secretary Chertoff*

## Executive Branch Intelligence Community Policy and Oversight

**Ms. Rachel Brand**

Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

**Mr. Jim Dempsey**

Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, established by Congress in 2007, is a bipartisan five-member Board appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The Board’s single mission is to evaluate the balance between civil liberties and security initiatives.

Ms. Brand and Mr. Dempsey belong to the Republican and Democrat parties, respectively, and both offered starkly different policy positions. Positions aside, both speakers agreed that the United States has been a world leader when attempting to balance Government surveillance and intelligence initiatives with civil liberties and personal privacy.

*“There is a misperception – both in the American public and outside the United States – that our intelligence agencies exercise broad powers with no supervision. This could not be farther from the truth. Everything these agencies do is subject to rules, procedures, and oversight, and in some cases many levels of rules, procedures, and oversight.*

*“I doubt that any country has an oversight system for counter-terrorism programs that is more robust than ours.” – Ms. Brand*

*“The lengthy process of ending the bulk collection of telephone metadata and replacing it with a more targeted program of access is, in my opinion, one of the oversight and civil liberties successes of the past decade. For several years, the interpretation of the statute supporting the bulk collection program was itself secret. The Board specifically criticized that, and I think there is some recognition within the executive branch that that kind of secrecy about statutory authorities was a mistake.” – Mr. Dempsey*

## Legislative Branch Security Policy

The Honorable Devin Nunes  
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

*“We currently do not have a comprehensive strategy to deal with ISIS, whether they be in Iraq, Syria, Africa, or elsewhere.” – Chairman Nunes*

The Forum was fortunate to host the Chairman of House Intelligence as he spoke on the various threats currently affecting the United States and its allies, and how security matters exacerbate without American leadership.



Chairman Nunes discussed how the lack of a comprehensive Middle East strategy has resulted in levels of Russian aggression that we have not seen since the Cold War. For example, it was reported that Russia appeared to be repeatedly violating Turkish airspace for weeks in its Middle East operations in support of the brutal Assad regime.

On November 17, Representative Pittenger wrote the Turkish Ambassador asking if the Turkish government had communicated at all with the Russian government regarding its sovereign airspace. Unfortunately, this situation culminated when Turkey appeared to have shot down a Russian warplane flying over its territory on November 24.

Chairman Nunes correctly warned that crises worsen without American leadership and clear strategic goals. Lawmakers must work to properly align budgeting and resourcing with targeted strategies in order to avoid these sorts of international crises.

## Countering Terrorism Financing

**Mr. Jamal El-Hindi**

Deputy Director, Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

**Mr. Jerome Beaumont**

Deputy Director, Tracfin (French Financial Intelligence)

**Mr. Frederick Reynolds**

Former Deputy Director, Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

**Mr. Mike Braun**

Former Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency

**Mr. David Asher**

Former Senior Advisor, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

**Mr. Yaya Fanusie**

Former Senior Advisor, National Counterterrorism Center

*“As Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, we have already held a half dozen different hearings on the subject of terrorist financing and at the appropriate time we look forward to working with our leadership and bringing legislation to help crimp the financial fuel line to terrorism.” – Chairman Hensarling*

*“Tracfin is ready to support any projects about cross-borders, beneficial owners, or any other initiative that could improve our common fight against terrorism financing. We are also ready to attend the next forum and if you need we should be able to gather French Members of Parliament who would wish to be involved with your Task Force.” – Deputy Director Beaumont*

The Intelligence-Security Forum hosted multiple panels on the subject of countering terrorist group financing. These panelists shared their expert views on how to stave the flow of resources to illicit organizations. Financial intelligence sharing helps law enforcement bridge the gap between terror suspects and larger criminal organizations that provide monetary support.

The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Fincen, serves as the Department’s Financial Intelligence Unit. Close to 200 million financial records go through Fincen for analysis. Fincen works with hundreds of international financial intelligence units in several countries, and it works with other American law enforcement, such as the FBI and Customs and Border Protection.

*“Fincen has a wealth of data that we are able to analyze and disseminate in the form of financial intelligence to our law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Reporting by financial institutions results in a rich collection of high value information essential to our efforts to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups.*

*“Fincen collects data under regulations developed subject to public comment. But along with collection, data privacy and data protection are also imperatives for Fincen and other Financial Intelligence Units. The public goal of using financial intelligence for anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism is not at odds with the public goals of data privacy. When it comes to meeting both these goals, policymakers must continue to support Financial Intelligence Units and their abilities to access and analyze data.” – Deputy Director El-Hindi*

## Cyber-security / Intelligence

**General Michael Hayden**

Former Director, National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency

**General Keith B. Alexander**

Former Director, National Security Agency



Between the two Generals, the Forum heard from 14 consecutive years of National Security Agency leadership – an invaluable session for lawmakers.

General Alexander discussed cyber-attacks and the historical context of implementing cyber-warfare between nation-states.

For example, in 2007, Estonia fell victim to Russian cyber-attacks after an international disagreement over former Soviet landmarks. Estonia banks online, votes online, and like many Americans, Estonians perform much of their lives online. The Russian attack included a denial of service technique that shut down critical infrastructure networks in Estonia for weeks, causing a national crisis.

One year later, in the first time in military history, Russia implemented cyber-tactics in conjunction with kinetic operations in Georgia. When Russia unlawfully invaded, it imposed similar denial of service operations to shut down essential government and critical infrastructure services.

General Hayden discussed his 4 principles when addressing cyber-security policy:

1. The majority of cyber-security must be performed by the private sector;
2. The government has a role in the small percentage of attacks that directly affect the government and critical infrastructure;
3. Lawmakers must define this role of government;
4. The government's role must be consistent with American values.

General Hayden expressed that many countries, such as Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea, do not view internet freedom in the same manner as the United States, and that when imposing cyber-security policy, America must remain committed to keeping the internet free and accessible to its citizens.

## China Policy

Mr. Dennis C. Shea

Vice Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Mr. Michael R. Wessel

Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

*"I don't think people appreciate China's double-digit percentage military budget increases. China is modernizing its Navy, its Air Force, and it has the most active cruise and ballistic missile development programs in the world. Additionally, it has a very active military-cyber program, as well as a military-space program."* – Vice Chairman Shea

*"In the mid-2000's, China began to realize the extent of military and economic assets that were available via cyber-theft. The cyber-domain has allowed China to acquire meaningful military technology without burdensome research and development."*

*"China recognizes America's reliance on the internet for military, economic, and social purposes. China's interest to challenge the United States comes easiest through promoting cyber-capabilities. These irregular warfare tactics have served as a significant force multiplier for China over the last decade"* – Commissioner Wessel

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission serves as an extension of Congress and acts as a comprehensive resource on China policy considerations affecting our government – including military strategy, cyber-security, foreign and domestic investment, currency manipulation, human rights, and trade.

Of note, the Commissioners warned the Forum about the close relationship the Chinese government imposes on certain domestic industries. Telecommunications, for example, is a chosen strategic industry in China, and many Chinese domestic companies are state-owned enterprises.

Companies based in China do not operate in a private sector that is similar to the private sector in the United States – the line dividing public and private sectors is blurred. Furthermore, there is no divide between the Chinese government and its military.

Chinese government involvement in its domestic telecommunications companies poses a problem for the United States when those companies attempt to increase their share in the U.S. market-place – both in the civilian and government sectors. Lawmakers must investigate the problems associated with allowing unapproved and potentially malicious hardware vendors access to markets – especially government markets.

### Closing Remarks

**Mr. Rudy Giuliani**

Former Mayor, New York, New York

**Mr. Kevin McCarthy**

House Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives

*“It is simple, we need more strategic direction from the Executive Branch.” – Mayor Giuliani*

*“Today, the world is increasingly dangerous. Those who love democracy and those who love freedom – it’s America’s responsibility to have their back.” – Leader McCarthy*

Mayor Giuliani and Leader McCarthy both reflected on the importance of the issues at hand, and how American leadership remains the single most important and effective foreign policy device in the world.

*“If we care about freedom, and we care about democracy – it’s not given to you. We must work together to achieve both.” – Leader McCarthy*



## Taskforce Recommendations

The following recommendations were produced on behalf of the Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare and do not necessarily represent the views of the Forum participants or panelists. The recommendations are published by Representative Pittenger in his role as Chairman of the Taskforce.

### Countering Terrorism Financing

**Recommendation 1:** Congress should work with financial institutions to collect and share beneficial ownership information on companies, trusts, and other legal entities that are registered within the United States.

The increased transparency as result of this policy change should help enforcement agencies track illicit money laundering operations and prevent the flow of funding to terrorists and terror organizations.

Further, Congress should consider additional enhanced data sharing initiatives between the government and private financial institutions to facilitate data analyzation.

**Recommendation 2:** Congress should codify the ability of financial institutions to share customer information with one another for the purposes of tracking illicit behavior that intersects multiple bank accounts and multiple institutions.

Facilitating bank-to-bank communication should assist law enforcement's ability to track the flow of dollars to terror organizations.

**Recommendation 3:** Congress should compel foreign governments to better enforce their own terror finance laws.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) rates countries and their efforts to enforce terror financing laws. FATF, itself, is not an enforcement agency. Congress should consider tying foreign assistance and foreign training programs with international FATF ratings, ensuring that foreign governments have a distinct incentive to better enforce their own terror finance laws. There must be a method to ensure cooperation.

**Recommendation 4:** Congress should support and reauthorize Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which allows the Treasury Department to take measures against foreign financial institutions that pose an identifiable money laundering threat.

Under Section 311, once a financial institution is designated by Treasury as a money laundering concern, Treasury can then impose special measures against the institution, including barring access to U.S. financial institutions.

The enforcement of Section 311 in non-complying countries is an effective tool in restricting money transfers through the international financial systems.

**Recommendation 5:** Congress should address the illicit money laundering situation in the Chinese casino territory, Macau.

It is estimated that the actual Macau market is six times its officially reported size, being valued approximately \$200 billion.<sup>1</sup> Much of that unreported market revolves around a process referred to as junket gambling. This process is notorious for facilitating illicit dollar transfers for criminal, drug, terror, or other illegal enterprises.

The Taskforce recommends that Congress investigate the junket gambling circuit in Macau and possibly impose penalties on casinos that facilitate illegal money transfers.

## Cybersecurity

**Recommendation 1:** The General Services Administration (GSA) should impose stricter subcontractor security requirements when approving vendors that sell information technology (IT) equipment to the federal government. These standards should be modeled after current Defense Department (DOD) rules.

Section 806 of the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act required the Defense Department to better manage its internal supply chain risks.<sup>2</sup> In turn, DOD imposed contract solicitation rules that require prime contractors to verify and be responsible for the security and supply chain provided by subcontractors. These rules have been updated by the Defense Department as of October 2015.<sup>3</sup> The Taskforce recommends that GSA consider adopting DOD's rule mechanism that requires prime contractors to assume greater supply chain security responsibilities for subcontractors they utilize.

**Recommendation 2:** Congress should impose a licensing requirement for Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies who wish to expand in the U.S. marketplace.

The Chinese government identifies strategic industries. Telecommunications is a chosen strategic industry, and the Chinese government maintains broad control over its state-owned companies.

The House Intelligence Committee produced an unclassified report in 2012 detailing the security threats posed by Chinese state-owned telecommunication companies.<sup>4</sup> There, House Intelligence recommended that the government avoid contracting with Chinese state-owned telecommunication companies. Additionally, House Intelligence recommended that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) block acquisitions, takeovers, or mergers involving these companies.

Echoing the sentiment in this report, the Taskforce recommends that Congress impose a licensing requirement on Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies who wish to expand in the United States. This license should be consistent with the import control authority authorized by the Arms

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<sup>1</sup> U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013 Annual Report, Page 355

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 111-383, § 806, 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, January 7, 2011

<sup>3</sup> Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Requirements Relating to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS Case 2012-D050), *Federal Register*, October 30, 2015, found at <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/10/30/2015-27463/defense-federal-acquisition-regulation-supplement-requirements-relating-to-supply-chain-risk-dfars>

<sup>4</sup> "Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE." House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, October 8, 2012.

Export Control Act<sup>5</sup> and be imposed to ensure that malicious telecommunication vendors cannot expand their role in the U.S. marketplace.

**Recommendation 3:** The United States and its allies should consider formulating a national counter-intrusion cyber-defense strategy.

As the Taskforce has witnessed, the United States does not have a uniform strategic response to state-sponsored cyber-attacks. The Taskforce recommends that Congress consider:

- Imposing penalties on states that sponsor cyber-attacks;
- Authorizing counter-intrusions as a response to cyber-attacks;
- Incentivizing federal law enforcement to more proactively publicize warrants for suspected state-sponsored hackers.

**Recommendation 4:** The Executive Branch should respect current law that prohibits NASA from engaging in bilateral space-related activities with China.<sup>6</sup>

Current law requires Congressional approval or a 30 day advance notification and security certification sent to Congress if the administration wishes to work with China in space. It has been reported that the State Department began a U.S.-China Civil Space Dialogue in October 2015, in direct violation of Congressionally mandated restrictions.<sup>7</sup>

The Taskforce recommends that Congress hold the administration accountable for violating current law regarding space relations with China.

## International Counterterrorism Policy

ISIS remains an unsolved problem for this administration. The longer ISIS remains on the battlefield, the more efficient the group's propaganda and recruitment efforts become. This leads to a proliferation of ISIS-related attacks, similar to the attacks in Paris and San Bernardino.

The Taskforce believes that if it is truly the administration's policy to degrade and defeat ISIS,<sup>8</sup> then it should take appropriate steps to achieve the stated goal. To date, the United States has yet to promote a serious counter-ISIS strategy that attempts to "defeat" the group. To the contrary, news reports only indicate additional terrorist attacks around the world and ISIS's ability to expand to parts of Northern Africa.

This administration has relied largely on precision airstrike operations to target ISIS. America has led significant bombing campaigns that have resulted in the destruction of meaningful targets, however these attacks have not demonstrated any significant strategic gains towards actually defeating the organization.

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<sup>5</sup> 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (a)(1)

<sup>6</sup> FY15 Commerce, Justice, and Science House Report (H. Rept. 113-448, Page 89, Section 552); included in FY15 Omnibus Appropriations Bill (H.R.83; Public Law No: 113-235)

<sup>7</sup> "Muted Response from Critics as State Department Prepares for Space Talks with China." *Space Policy Online*, August 3, 2015, found at <http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/muted-response-from-critics-as-state-department-prepares-for-space-talks-with-china>

<sup>8</sup> 2015 National Security Strategy, Page 2

In December 2015, the President announced that the United States and its allies have conducted approximately 9,000 airstrikes on ISIS targets.<sup>9</sup> The President indicated that the United States is hitting ISIS “harder than ever.”<sup>10</sup> However, it is important to reflect on what we have to show for it.

For the past year and a half, our Defense Department has consistently estimated that ISIS forces remain between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers<sup>11</sup> – indicating that airstrikes alone have not impacted the number of soldiers on the battlefield.

Additionally, this administration has done little to undermine or disrupt ISIS’s headquarter operations in Ar Raqqa. This is largely because it appears to be difficult to expand an airstrike-only policy into Raqqa due to the dense civilian population and high probability of collateral damage.<sup>12</sup> ISIS compounds are firmly entrenched in civilian areas, which restricts American bombardment abilities.

In September 2015, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, referred to our current airstrike strategy to defeat ISIS as tactically stalemated.<sup>13</sup> Further, in July 2015, Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, stated that he believes ISIS will fight for 10 to 20 years if they are not otherwise promptly removed from the battlefield.<sup>14</sup>

As recently as November 2015, U.S. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James commented on how air power alone cannot accomplish the strategic goal of defeating ISIS:

“Air power is extremely important. It can do a lot but it can’t do everything. [...] Ultimately, it cannot occupy territory and very importantly it cannot govern territory. [...] This is where we need to have boots on the ground. We do need to have ground forces in this campaign.”<sup>15</sup>

Defense Secretary Carter has echoed that the United States is currently not doing enough to defeat ISIS:

“But if you say, is it enough [our current strategy]? I don’t think it’s enough. I think we’re looking to do more. But the fundamental strategy in Iraq and Syria for dealing with ISIL and dealing a lasting defeat to ISIL is to identify then train, equip, and enable local forces that keep the peace.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> “Obama: ISIS Strategy ‘moving forward with great sense of urgency.’” *CNN*, December 14, 2015, *found at* <http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/politics/obama-pentagon-isis-strategy/>

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*

<sup>11</sup> “ISIS can ‘muster’ between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters, CIA says.” *CNN*, September 12, 2014, *found at* <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria-iraq/>; *see also* “ISIS By the Numbers: Foreign Fighter Total Keeps Growing.” *NBC News*, February 28, 2015, *found at* <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-numbers-foreign-fighter-total-keeps-growing-n314731>; *see also* “Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts.” *New York Times*, September 26, 2015, *found at*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html>

<sup>12</sup> “Strikes on Raqqa in Syria Lead to More Questions Than Results.” *New York Times*, November 17, 2015, *found at* <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/middleeast/strikes-on-raqqa-in-syria-lead-to-more-questions-than-results.html>

<sup>13</sup> “Sources Detail Skewed Reports On How The U.S. Is Doing Against ISIS.” *NPR*, September 18, 2015, *found at* <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/16/440969194/sources-detail-skewed-reports-on-how-the-u-s-is-doing-against-isis>

<sup>14</sup> “Odierno: ISIS Fight Will Last ‘10 To 20 Years.’” *Defense News*, July 17, 2015, *found at*

<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/07/17/odierno-isis-fight-last-10-20-years/30295949/>

<sup>15</sup> “USAF Secretary: War on IS Needs ‘Boots on Ground.’” *Defense News*, November 10, 2015, *found at* <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/11/10/usaf-secretary-war-needs-boots-ground/75527160/>

<sup>16</sup> “Remarks on ‘Strategic and Operational Innovation at a Time of Transition and Turbulence’ at Reagan Defense Forum.” Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, U.S. Department of Defense, November 7, 2015, *found at*

<http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/628147/remarks-on-strategic-and>

Unfortunately, Secretary Carter's aforementioned statement came a month after it was widely reported that the United States would be scaling back its Syria rebel training program.<sup>17</sup> This drawdown was a reflection of the program's overall failure, which culminated in General Lloyd Austin testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, as of September 2015, the U.S. had only "4 or 5" active rebels in its training program.<sup>18</sup>

**Recommendation 1:** The United States should ensure the policies it implements reflect the country's stated strategic goals.

As stated previously in this report, history is not kind to nation-states that do not reconcile policy and resource allocation with stated strategic goals. The Taskforce believes the administration must act urgently to review its current policies to ensure they align with strategic goals they are willing to achieve. The United States will not be able to effectively defeat ISIS if its policies do not match its strategic goals.

**Recommendation 2:** Congress should create an independent commission to review the effectiveness of conducting airstrikes against terror organizations without an accompanied ground campaign.

As stated by Air Force Secretary James, airstrikes alone, while effective, cannot substitute for a comprehensive strategy to defeat a terrorist organization. The United States, however, has implemented this strategy repeatedly for decades.

Many Presidents, including Reagan, Clinton, and Bush 43 have utilized airstrike-only policies in certain circumstances to address terrorist organizations. However, no President has relied on an airstrike-only policy as extensively as the Obama administration, and few would have anticipated that this airstrike implementation would have lasted as long as it has without the accompaniment of ground troops.

The Taskforce agrees that it is important to posture against enemies of the United States, but cautions that indefinite bombing campaigns should not be employed as a substitute for a strategy to defeat a terrorist organization. Airstrikes serve as an important supplement, but cannot be confused with an affirmative strategy.

As previously mentioned, the United States and coalition forces have conducted over 9,000 airstrikes on ISIS. Yet, it appears the battlefield impact has been minimal, and many disagree as to the effectiveness of airstrikes without troop engagement.

With that in mind, the Taskforce urges Congress to consider tasking a commission to report on the benefits and challenges of restricted airstrike-only campaigns against terrorist organizations without the presence of a ground campaign. Few predicted that the United States would employ such heavy usage of this strategy, and it is important to quantify what benefits exist to such a strategy.

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<sup>17</sup> "Pentagon to Scale Back Troubled Syria Rebel Training Program." *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 2015, found at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-plans-new-approach-on-syria-rebel-training-1444394385>

<sup>18</sup> "You Can Literally Count the Number of U.S.-Trained Syrians Fighting ISIS on One Hand." *U.S. News*, September 16, 2015, found at <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/16/general-only-4-or-5-us-trained-syrian-fighters-operating-against-isis>

**Recommendation 3:** The United States should develop a strategy to effectively deal with Russia and its placement of air defense systems within Syria.

It was reported in November 2015 that Russia delivered and deployed air defense systems into Syria.<sup>19</sup> Strategically, the presence of Russian air defense systems in Syria significantly challenges American regional initiatives. The Taskforce believes the United States must create and implement a strategy to diminish Russia's regional presence and stop the flow of Russian military equipment into Syria.



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<sup>19</sup> “Russia deploys cutting-edge S-400 air defense system to Syrian base after Su-24 downing.” *RT News*, November 26, 2015, found at <https://www.rt.com/news/323596-s400-russia-syria-airbase-turkey/>

## Appendix I

### U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Recommendations

#### **COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS**

##### **Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations**

##### ***Section 2: Foreign Investment Climate in China***

The Commission recommends:

1. Congress assess the ability of, and if necessary amend, existing U.S. trade laws to address China's industrial policies, abusive legal or administrative processes, and discriminatory treatment of foreign investors, and to determine the consistency of these practices with China's World Trade Organization commitments.
2. Congress consider legislation requiring the President to submit a request to Congress for approval before any change occurs, either for the country as a whole or for individual sectors or entities, in China's status as a non-market economy. Under such legislation, any change to the designation of China could not proceed without the consent of both Houses of Congress.
3. Congress consider legislation conditioning the provision of market access to Chinese investors in the United States on a reciprocal, sector-by-sector basis to provide a level playing field for U.S. investors in China.
4. Congress direct U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies to conduct an analysis and legal assessment of alleged anticompetitive behavior by Chinese antitrust enforcers, and report in full on enforcement activities.
5. Congress expand the guidelines for consultation and transparency relating to trade negotiations covered by Trade Promotion Authority to include negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and China.
6. Congress require the Administration to provide a comprehensive, publicly-available assessment of Chinese foreign direct investments in the United States prior to completion of negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty. This assessment should include an identification of the nature of investments, whether investments received support of any kind from the Chinese government and at which level (national, provincial, or municipal), and the sector in which the investment was made.
7. Congress urge the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate consultations with China's Ministry of Commerce to identify the extent to which China's policy regarding subsidies and other incentives for purchases of domestically-produced new energy vehicles may violate its World Trade Organization commitments and what steps should be taken to address any inconsistencies with those commitments.

***Section 3: China's State-Led Market Reform and Competitiveness Agenda***

The Commission recommends:

8. Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report that analyzes U.S. exposure to China's financial sector, the progress of China's financial sector reforms, and the effect of China's financial sector reforms on the U.S. and global financial systems, and identifies the policies the U.S. government is adopting to protect U.S. interests in light of this changing environment.
9. Congress urge the U.S. Department of Commerce to undertake a comprehensive review and prepare a report on China's Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus initiatives, including their forced localization of manufacturing and research and development requirements, to determine their potential impact on domestic U.S. production and market access for U.S. firms.
10. Congress direct the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Commerce to jointly prepare a report that outlines China's stated targets to address pollution and climate change, and evaluates whether the Chinese government has allocated sufficient resources (including expenditures) to meet those commitments.

***Section 4: Commercial Cyber Espionage and Barriers to Digital Trade in China***

The Commission recommends:

11. Congress assess the coverage of U.S. law to determine whether U.S.-based companies that have been hacked should be allowed to engage in counterintrusions for the purpose of recovering, erasing, or altering stolen data in offending computer networks. In addition, Congress should study the feasibility of a foreign intelligence cyber court to hear evidence from U.S. victims of cyber attacks and decide whether the U.S. government might undertake counterintrusions on a victim's behalf.
12. Congress require the Administration to prepare an annual classified report on foreign government-sponsored cyber attacks against all Federal Government agencies, including but not limited to an assessment of the damage and the affected agencies' plans to secure their networks against further attacks.
13. Congress consider legislation amending the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 to require an annual review by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security of the steps taken by all federal agencies to ensure that adequate systems are in place to protect cyber assets.
14. Congress pass legislation to require the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to make clear to publicly traded companies and their investors the circumstances under which the theft of intellectual property through a computer network intrusion may be a material fact that might affect a company's revenues and should therefore be required to be disclosed to the SEC.

15. Congress evaluate existing consumer right-to-know laws to determine whether a cloud-based computing company has an affirmative duty to identify the physical location of its cloud-based assets.

## **Chapter 2: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving China**

### ***Section 2: China's Space and Counterspace Programs***

The Commission recommends:

16. Congress continue to support the U.S. Department of Defense's efforts to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. space assets through cost-effective solutions, such as the development of smaller and more distributed satellites, hardened satellite communications, and non-space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles.
17. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, and relevant agencies within the U.S. Intelligence Community to jointly prepare a classified report that performs a net assessment of U.S. and Chinese counterspace capabilities. The report should include a strategic plan for deterring, with active and passive systems, strikes against U.S. assets in light of other countries' rapid advancements in kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace technology.
18. Congress direct appropriate jurisdictional entities to undertake a review of (1) the classification of satellites and related articles on the U.S. Munitions List under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations and (2) the prohibitions on exports of Commerce Control List satellites and related technologies to China under the Export Administration Regulations, in order to determine which systems and technologies China is likely to be able to obtain on the open market regardless of U.S. restrictions and which are critical technologies that merit continued U.S. protection.
19. Congress allocate additional funds to the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center for the translation and analysis of Chinese-language technical and military writings, in order to deepen U.S. understanding of China's defense strategy, particularly related to space.

### ***Section 3: China's Offensive Missile Forces***

The Commission recommends:

20. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to provide an unclassified estimate of the People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force's inventory of missiles and launchers, by type, in future iterations of its *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, as included previously but suspended following the 2010 edition.

21. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to prepare a report on the potential benefits and costs of incorporating ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional cruise and ballistic missile systems into the United States' defensive force structure in the Asia Pacific, in order to explore how such systems might help the U.S. military sustain a cost-effective deterrence posture.
22. Congress continue to support initiatives to harden U.S. bases in the Asia Pacific, including the Pacific Airpower Resiliency Initiative, in order to increase the costliness and uncertainty of conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes against these facilities, and thereby dis-incentivize a first strike and increase regional stability.
23. Congress continue to support "next-generation" missile defense initiatives such as directed energy and rail gun technologies, and require the U.S. Department of Defense to report to committees of jurisdiction on the status of current component sourcing plans for the development and production of directed energy weapons.

### **Chapter 3: China and the World**

#### ***Section 1: China and Central Asia***

The Commission recommends:

24. Congress request classified briefings from the U.S. Intelligence Community on the nature of U.S.-China cooperation on counterterrorism to ensure the U.S. government is not inadvertently supporting Chinese counterterror policies and tactics that undermine human rights.
25. Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report assessing the U.S. New Silk Road policy. This report should evaluate the New Silk Road's strengths and weaknesses and its current status and future prospects for meeting U.S. policy objectives in Central Asia. This report should investigate how U.S. policy toward Central Asia intersects and interacts with U.S. policy toward China more broadly, and how the U.S. and Chinese Silk Road initiatives interact in Central Asia.
26. Members of Congress and their staffs consider traveling to Central Asia, and, when doing so, engage with U.S. business community and nongovernmental organizations to discuss ways of improving human rights, rule of law, environmental protection, and business environment.

#### ***Section 2: China and Southeast Asia***

The Commission recommends:

27. Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report assessing the effectiveness of recent U.S. efforts to enhance the maritime security capabilities of allies and partners in Southeast Asia and identifying the remaining challenges and opportunities.

28. Congress urge the Administration to enhance its support for regional information sharing institutions focused on maritime security in Southeast Asia.
29. Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to expand its August 2015 report *Southeast Asia: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement* to evaluate whether Chinese government funded investment and assistance projects in Southeast Asia negatively affect U.S.-funded projects in Southeast Asia.

### **Section 3: Taiwan**

The Commission recommends:

30. Congress urge the Administration to make available to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, defense articles and services required to address the continuing shift in the cross-strait military balance toward China.
31. Congress direct the Administration to invite Taiwan to participate at least as an observer at U.S.-led bilateral and multilateral military and security exercises, including future Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Cyber Storm exercises.
32. Congress encourage the Administration to increase its public support of Taiwan's participation in international organizations,\* which would help Taiwan expand its status and legitimacy in the international community.
33. Congress require the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Commerce to jointly prepare a classified report on Taiwan's role in the U.S. strategy in Asia. The report should include an overview of Taiwan's current role in the strategy; U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation and a description of all joint programs; and opportunities for Taiwan's inclusion in U.S. Asia strategy.

### **Section 4: Hong Kong**

The Commission recommends:

34. Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong, and that Congress encourage senior Administration officials, including the secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel.
35. Congress sustain the language in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2016 reauthorizing the report requirement under the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 supporting human rights and democracy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
36. Congress urge the U.S. Department of State to increase its public diplomacy efforts in Hong Kong in support of press freedom, media independence, and academic freedom.

\*These organizations may include: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, and International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

37. Congress engage parliamentarians from the United Kingdom in an interparliamentary review of China's adherence to the Basic Law since the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, with specific attention to rule of law, progress in achieving universal suffrage, and press freedom.

## Appendix II

### Participant Notes

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**PARLIAMENT OF ALBANIA  
THE SPEAKER**

Tirana, on 04.11.2015

Hon. Robert Pittenger  
Chairman  
Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare

Dear Chairman Pittenger,

*Dear Robert,*

It was an honor to be invited and participate in the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum organized so excellently by you in Dc last week. The elaborated presentations and the stirring debates on important themes that threaten our security, priorities in the fight against terrorism and its finances, oversight of our democratic institutions and the role of parliaments were a good opportunity to exchange views and ideas on our national and common efforts to deal with these concerns.


I guaranty you that Albania will continue to be the strongest and most loyal ally of United States in the Balkans and will increase our efforts in dealing with these issues, as well as enhancing our national capacities and strengthen relationship and cooperation with US specialized agencies to prevent and fight terrorism, extremism and its resources.

As we discussed in our meeting, I am personally committed to organize and host in Albania the next round of this esteemed Forum, to bring together high representatives from Parliaments in the region, United States and other partner countries of Euro-Atlantic area and share our experiences on security issues of common concern. This event would be also an excellent opportunity to have a great friend like you in Albania and to enjoy the flavors of a small but ancient Balkan and Mediterranean country.

Expressing to you the assurance of my highest esteem, I remain.

Respectfully,

Ilir Meta





REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



Nicosia, 16 December 2015

*The Hon. Robert Pittinger,  
Member of the US Congress,  
Washington, D.C..*

*Dear Colleague*

*Thank you for your request to provide input for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum, which took place in Washington D.C. last October. Allow me to congratulate you once more for the smooth organization of the conference, which I found of utmost interest.*

*I would like to once more share my opinion that, as regards internal and by extension international security, a more general cooperation plan and scheme should be developed, in which small countries would be able to participate. This is especially due to the fact that, while their resources are limited, they often have increased needs for security, in particular as a result of their critical location. Alternative ways to overcome this lack of ways, means and know-how should be explored in a collective way, mainly because of the interconnection between each country's security and stability, as well as due to the fact that the now multi-faceted threats to international security are common to us all.*

*Wishing you every success in your endeavours, particularly in relation to the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum, let me express, dear Colleague, my highest consideration and wish you a very Merry Festive Season and a Happy New Year.*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Demetris Syllouris, MP,  
Deputy Chairman of the House Standing Committee on  
Institutions, Merit and the Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman).*

ST/ST



*Parliament of Romania*  
*Chamber of Deputies*

**Congressman Robert PITTENGER**  
**Chairman of the Congressional Taskforce on**  
**Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare**  
**U.S. House of Representatives**

Bucharest, 4 November 2015  
113441/08

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I would like to thank you for the excellent organization of the Parliamentary Security-Intelligence Forum and the extremely useful discussions regarding the policies in this area.

The current geopolitical context, the dynamic of the events on the old European continent, as well as the danger of growing terrorist threats are most important concerns for our citizens. As a consequence, they represent crucial challenges for us, the representatives of people, accountable and responsible for our electorate.

From this perspective, the Parliamentary Security - Intelligence Forum represented a framework to analyze the optimal transfer of know-how from the states with expertise in this domain to less experienced countries in fighting major threats.

For the Romanian delegation, it was good chance to reiterate, in the discussions with representatives of the guest parliaments and with congressmen serving on several Select Committees, the determination to continue to bring a substantial contribution to the stability in our region and to the general effort on combating terrorism.

Romania is a stability pillar in a region in turmoil and has a unique geostrategic position in the Black Sea area. In this regard, we would like to highlight the involvement of our country, a strategic partner of the U.S., in securing the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly in highly sensitive fields, such as the cyber security.

Please allow me, dear Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you once again for organizing the third edition of this useful thematic forum and to express our openness toward the future collaboration on such issues of great interest for all of us.

Looking forward to furthering the exchange of views on fighting against the current threats to the democratic values, I assure you, dear Mr. Chairman, of my highest consideration.

*Sincerely,*

*V. Zgonea*  
**Valeriu Ștefan ZGONEA**



**Dr. Fritz Felgentreu**  
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

Dr. Fritz Felgentreu MdB, Platz der Republik 1, 11011 Berlin

The Honorable Robert Pittenger  
Member of Congress  
House of Representatives  
224 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
The United States of America

Berlin, November 20, 2015

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### **Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum 2015**

Dear Robert,

Thank you for your letter, your hospitality, the vital debate as well as your outstanding support during the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum 2015 in Washington, DC.

The challenges, which we discussed during the forum, will be on the transatlantic agenda for many years to come. The recent attacks in Paris demonstrate that it is significant for the western democracies to develop and implement common answers to these challenges within our community of shared values.

I am very much looking forward to our future meetings and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Fritz Felgentreu

**Fonda, Clark**

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**From:** BEAUMONT Jerome [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 26, 2015 11:33 AM  
**To:** Fonda, Clark  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Rep. Pittenger

Dear Mr Fonda

Sorry for my late response and thank you and Congressman Pittenger for your concern.

After difficult and busy days, I take some time to indicate the following :

Please inform Mr Pittenger that My Director and I are ready to support any projects about crossborders, beneficial owners or any other initiative that could improve our common fight against terrorism financing.  
We are also ready to attend the next forum and if you need we should be able to gather French MPs who will probably be more involved in TF.

Best regards

Jérôme Beaumont

French Financial Intelligence Unit  
TRACFIN



PERMANENT MISSION OF ROMANIA  
to the International Organizations in Vienna

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[www.romania.at](http://www.romania.at)

*The Ambassador*

Vienna, 30 November 2015

The Honorable Robert Pittenger  
Chairman  
Congressional Taskforce on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare  
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I would like to thank you for the letter following the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum that took place on 27-28 October 2015 in Washington, D.C. and which I had the pleasure to attend upon your kind invitation.

Indeed, the Forum provided an excellent platform to discuss topical national security and intelligence policy issues, as well as to identify effective ways to counter terrorism and cyber threats.

At the same time, the Forum highlighted once again that the sharing of individual perspectives and best practices, including at parliamentary level, should continue to be regarded as one of our best instruments to highlight both opportunities for cooperation and issues of common concern in further strengthening our responses to such critical threats.

Countering terrorism, in particular the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, the financing of terrorism, and preventing and combating violent extremism are likely to remain prevailing concerns in 2016. The OSCE Security Committee will continue to address these topical issues as priorities also in 2016.

Wishing you every success in your future endeavors in enhancing dialogue and cooperation in countering global terrorism and cyber threats, please accept, Mr. Chairman, the expression of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Cristian Istrate



*Parliament of Romania*  
*Chamber of Deputies*

**Congressman Robert PITTENGER**  
**Chairman of the Congressional Taskforce on**  
**Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare**  
**U.S. House of Representatives**

Bucharest, 4 November 2015  
1/3441/18

Dear Mr. Chairman,

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From this perspective, the Parliamentary Security - Intelligence Forum represented a framework to analyze the optimal transfer of know-how from the states with expertise in this domain to less experienced countries in fighting major threats.

For the Romanian delegation, it was good chance to reiterate, in the discussions with representatives of the guest parliaments and with congressmen serving on several Select Committees, the determination to continue to bring a substantial contribution to the stability in our region and to the general effort on combating terrorism.

Romania is a stability pillar in a region in turmoil and has a unique geostrategic position in the Black Sea area. In this regard, we would like to highlight the involvement of our country, a strategic partner of the U.S., in securing the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly in highly sensitive fields, such as the cyber security.

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Looking forward to furthering the exchange of views on fighting against the current threats to the democratic values, I assure you, dear Mr. Chairman, of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

St. V. Zecus